Menu
Log in
AMEJA Media Resource Guide: Reporting on Iran
Media Resource Guide

Reporting on Iran:
A Guide for Accurate and Ethical Coverage Amid Escalating Conflict

Updated March 2026

As of March 2026, the United States and Israel have launched direct military strikes on targets inside Iran, transforming what had long been a shadow war of cyberattacks, proxy clashes, and covert operations into overt interstate confrontation. The escalation has raised the prospect of sustained regional warfare involving not only Israel and Iran, but also armed groups across Lebanon, Iraq, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association (AMEJA) has prepared this guide to support coverage of Iran that is precise, contextualized, and responsible.

This guide aims to:

  • Provide key context on Iranian politics, society, and foreign policy
  • Support source protection, particularly for those inside Iran
  • Address misleading narratives and disinformation
  • Equip newsrooms with tools for accurate, ethical reporting.

This is a living document developed in consultation with journalists, regional experts, and media professionals. We encourage newsrooms to adopt and adapt these practices as events evolve.

The Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association urges anyone covering this issue to:

Be aware that Iranian sources both domestically and in the diaspora face significantly higher security risks than other parts of the world, which can complicate reporting, like sources to self censoring. Care should be taken to ensure that coverage does not inadvertently endanger sources.

Best practices for sourcing in high-risk environments:

Explain the historical tension between Iran and Israel and how we have arrived at the current conflict.

The direct military exchanges of February–March 2026 represent the culmination of a yearslong shadow conflict between Israel and Iran that had already included cyberattacks, sabotage of nuclear facilities, targeted killings of Iranian scientists, Israeli strikes on Iranian positions in Syria, maritime incidents, and expanding missile and drone capabilities on both sides. Israel has consistently framed its operations as efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear and regional military reach, while Iran has expanded uranium enrichment beyond the limits of the 2015 nuclear agreement and deepened ties with armed groups across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The 2024 Israeli strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Syria and the collapse of renewed nuclear talks in February 2026 removed key diplomatic guardrails, accelerating the shift from indirect confrontation to overt interstate warfare.

Nuclear agreement timeline:

  • 1968/1970 – Iran signs (1968) and ratifies (1970) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
  • Mid 1990s – Iran builds nuclear research and power facilities, signs the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
  • 2002 – Western intelligence reveals Natanz enrichment site
  • 2003 – Iran suspends nuclear enrichment amidst talks with Britain, France and Germany
  • 2006 – Iran resumes enrichment. UN Security Council passes vote to place sanctions
  • 2010 – Stuxnet cyberattack is discovered
  • 2012 – String of assassinations take place, notably the targeting of Iranian nuclear scientists
  • 2015 – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is signed
  • 2016 – IAEA certifies Iranian compliance
  • 2018 – President Trump withdraws for JCPOA, places sanctions
  • 2020 – U.S. kills Qassem Soleimani, more nuclear scientists killed
  • 2023 – Amid political protests and Biden administration, effort to kickstart JCPOA fail
  • 2024 – Israel strikes Iranian embassy in Syria
  • May 2025 – The IAEA expresses serious concern about Iran's “significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium.”
  • June 2025 – Israel launches a coordinated air and drone strike on Iranian military and nuclear sites, reportedly killing senior officials; Iran responds with missile and drone attacks on Israeli cities, marking the most direct exchange of strikes between the two countries to date.
  • January 2026 – Indirect U.S.–Iran nuclear talks resume under the Trump administration, led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, even as U.S. forces begin a rapid military buildup in the region.
  • Feb. 11, 2026 – Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets President Trump in the Oval Office, pressing against diplomacy and urging military action.
  • Feb. 21, 2026 – Witkoff publicly describes Iran’s refusal to agree to “zero enrichment,” signaling widening gaps in negotiations.
  • Feb. 26, 2026 – Final round of U.S.–Iran nuclear talks held in Geneva; Iranian proposal rejected; U.S. officials conclude a deal is unlikely.
  • Feb. 27, 2026 – President Trump authorizes “Operation Epic Fury” while aboard Air Force One.
  • Feb. 28, 2026 – Joint U.S.–Israeli strikes begin across Iran, including decapitation strikes on senior leadership and nuclear infrastructure. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, is confirmed killed.
  • March 2026 – U.S. signals campaign could last weeks. Administration officials acknowledge no imminent Iranian preemptive strike had been detected

Common Pitfalls in Framing

  • Avoid collapsing nuclear policy into regime change. U.S. and Israeli officials have framed strikes as targeting nuclear and military infrastructure. Some officials have also made public remarks about leadership removal. Distinguish clearly between stated military objectives, operational targets, and political outcomes. Do not treat these as interchangeable.
  • Avoid binary tropes such as “regime vs the people” or “terrorists vs democracy.” Iran is a complex society of over 90 million people with diverse political, ethnic, and religious perspectives. Public opinion is not static, and wartime conditions can compress or distort visible dissent.
  • Avoid unqualified use of the term “terrorist.” Follow established newsroom standards (e.g., Reuters guidance): use specific descriptors such as “armed group,” “militant organization,” or “attacker,” unless directly quoting a source. Labeling carries legal and political implications and should be attributed.
  • Attribute claims of command-and-control relationships. Assertions about Iran directing regional armed groups (Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Houthis, etc.) should be sourced to official statements, intelligence assessments, or named experts. The degree of operational control versus strategic alignment is often debated and should not be presented as settled fact without evidence.
  • Separate verified facts from official claims. All parties — Iranian officials, U.S. agencies, Israeli leadership, and regional actors — are engaged in active information operations. In February–March 2026, U.S. officials acknowledged privately that intelligence did not indicate an imminent Iranian preemptive strike before the joint attacks. That distinction matters.
  • Be precise about nuclear timelines. Warnings that Iran is just “weeks” or “months” away from developing a nuclear weapon have recurred for more than a decade, since at least 2012. Enrichment levels, stockpile size, weaponization capability, and delivery systems are distinct technical questions. Avoid compressing them into a single “breakout.” Cite monitoring bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides independent assessments based on inspections and verified data. At the start of the February–March 2026 escalation, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi reiterated that inspectors had “no evidence of Iran building a nuclear bomb,” while warning that Iran’s large stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium and limits on inspector access remain a serious concern.

Iranian Foreign Policy and Proxy Alliances

Iran’s foreign policy is marked by a network of alliances and strategic interests across the Middle East, extending its influence through various groups and nations. It is essential to understand that "support" does not necessarily equate to "control" in these relationships; often, they are alliances of convenience rather than direct command. Iran’s presence is notably strong in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine, and Afghanistan, where it leverages its connections to promote its regional objectives.

Avoid the Proxy Trap

It is common for political rhetoric — particularly from U.S., Israeli, or Gulf officials — to describe these groups as “Iranian proxies.” While some do receive significant support from Iran, equating support with direct control is often misleading.

Instead say:

“Iran-aligned,” “Iran-backed,” “receives support from Iran,” or “shares strategic interests with Iran.”

These phrases allow for nuance without assuming command-and-control dynamics. Many of these groups were founded independently of Iran’s involvement, focused on local or national goals (e.g., Palestinian liberation, Iraqi politics), or leveraging Iran's support to advance their own missions, not acting as surrogates.

Example framing:

“While supported by Iran, the Houthis pursue their own domestic agenda in Yemen, and have at times acted independently of Iranian interests.”

When in doubt, attribute. If you’re reporting that Iran gives orders, funds entire operations, or deploys strategic commands, you must attribute it to intelligence agencies, government officials, or expert analysts.

Example:

“According to U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials, Iran has provided advanced weapons to Hezbollah and continues to coordinate certain operations.”

Note: While all these groups maintain varying degrees of alignment with Iran, it is important to distinguish between ideological sympathy, logistical coordination, and direct operational control. In many cases, relationships are shaped by overlapping strategic interests rather than command-and-control dynamics.

Repatriation/unfreezing of Iranian sovereign funds, are not “payments”

When covering the unfreezing of Iranian funds under diplomatic agreements, clarify that these are repatriated sovereign assets—not payments or aid. Mischaracterizing them may contribute to disinformation and undermine public understanding.

The relationship between Iran, Palestine and Israel

While the Islamic Republic of Iran has, from its beginnings in 1979, made identification with the Palestine liberation struggle a cornerstone of its foreign policy, the regime's support for Palestinian armed groups must be seen in a larger geopolitical context, especially as a strategy of deterrence against what it has long considered its most dangerous adversary, namely the United States, and what it has seen as US proxies: Israel and conservative Arab monarchies such as Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s support for Palestinian groups is rooted in a combination of ideological and strategic motives. Coverage should distinguish between popular support, state policy, and geopolitical considerations. It should be understood, too, that popular Iranian support for the Palestinian struggle long predates the Iranian revolution, and while the previous, pre-revolutionary regime maintained security and political ties with Israel, those, too, were based on pragmatic considerations, and it has been argued that its relations with Israel were not as deep as current pro-monarchist Iranian activists have asserted in recent years.

Diversity Within Iran

Along with the significant Persian majority, Iran is home to multiple ethnic groups including Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Balochs, Lurs, and many others. Grievances around cultural rights, economic neglect, and political representation exist across regions but should not be generalized as separatist.

Guidance:

  • Avoid portraying ethnic communities as monolithic or inherently oppositional.
  • Be aware of local context and historical nuance in reporting on unrest or protest.

Shia vs Sunni Islam - differences, similarities, limits on reducing tensions to sectarianism.

Officials from certain states have long leveraged sectarian differences to challenge Iran's legitimacy among Palestinians, Egyptians, Jordanians, and other predominantly Sunni Arab populations.

Diagram of Iran’s regime structure

Resources on Iran’s Role in Regional Armed Groups

IRAN EXPERTS

This reference list highlights journalists, scholars, and analysts whose work offers critical insight into Iran's political, cultural, and social dynamics. The individuals below are cited in major outlets, publish peer-reviewed research, and regularly contribute to informed public discourse on Iran. Curated by AMEJA for use by editors, producers, and reporters seeking credible and diverse voices.

Inclusion does not imply endorsement by AMEJA. Experts are listed for informational purposes based on their publicly available work.

Yeganeh Torbati
The New York Times | @yjtorbati

Iran correspondent and award-winning journalist covering Iranian politics, U.S. national security, immigration, and business. She previously reported for The Washington Post, ProPublica, Reuters, and The Baltimore Sun, and is co-author of Stolen Revolution: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran.

Holly Dagres
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy | @hdagres

Senior fellow and curator of The Iranist newsletter. An Iranian-American analyst with fifteen years of experience in the Middle East, her work focuses on Iranian politics, civil society, and digital discourse.

Arang Keshavarzian
NYU | arang.keshavarzian@nyu.edu

Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. A leading expert on Iran’s political economy and regional trade dynamics, his research explores authoritarian governance, spatial politics, and socio-economic hierarchies shaping Iran and the Persian Gulf.

Narges Bajoghli
Johns Hopkins University | @nargesbajoghli | Narges.Bajoghli@jhu.edu

Anthropologist and media scholar specializing in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, propaganda, and state-society dynamics. She offers rare insight into how Iran’s military and media apparatus respond to external attacks.

Alex Shams
AJAM Media Collective | @alexshams | ashams07@gmail.com

Writer, anthropologist, and editor-in-chief of Ajam Media Collective. Shams has PhD from the University of Chicago focused on Iran and Middle East politics. With reporting experience across Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine, he brings a nuanced grassroots lens to Iranian public sentiment and cultural responses in times of conflict.

Assal Rad
Fellow Arab Center Washington DC | @assalrad

Historian of modern Iran and U.S.–Middle East relations, and Nonresident Fellow at DAWN. Author of The State of Resistance, she provides timely analysis on Iranian politics, identity, and protest, and is a go-to voice for understanding how U.S. foreign policy shapes domestic dynamics during conflict.

Azadeh Moaveni
@azadehmoaveni | UK-Based

Journalist, author, and NYU professor with two decades of experience covering Iran and the broader Middle East. Her expertise in gender, conflict, and political transformation makes her an essential voice for understanding how war and state repression shape civil society and regional dynamics.

Hooman Majd
@hmajd

Author, journalist, and NBC News contributor with a unique perspective as a former translator for Iranian presidents and commentator on U.S.–Iran relations. With a sharp critique of both regime and opposition, Majd brings rare contextual depth on Iran’s internal politics and foreign policy messaging during moments of escalation.

Nahid Siamdoust
University of Austin | Nahid.siamdoust@austin.utexas.edu

Scholar of Iranian media and cultural politics, and author of Soundtrack of the Revolution. With deep expertise in music, public discourse, and state power, she offers an essential lens on how Iranians use culture and digital platforms to respond to state violence and crisis.

Rana Rahimpour
Former BBC Persian anchor | @ranarahimpour

Veteran broadcast journalist with deep reporting experience on Iranian politics, society, and diaspora perspectives. A strong source for real-time narrative framing and international media comparisons.

Reza Talebi
Journalist | @rezatalebi

Policy analyst and writer focused on civil society, digital repression, and Iranian diaspora mobilization. He provides insight into how state violence and cyber measures affect protest networks and diaspora activism.


©2022 AMEJA.org All Rights Reserved

Powered by Wild Apricot Membership Software